In a popular electronic cash scheme, there are three participants: the bank, the customer, and the merchant. First, a customer opens an account in a bank. Then, he withdraws an -cash from his account and pays it to a merchant. After checking the electronic cash's validity, the merchant accepts it and deposits it to the bank. There are a number of requirements for an electronic cash scheme, such as, anonymity, unforgeability, unreusability, divisibility, transferability, and portability. Anonymity property of electronic cash schemes can ensure the privacy of payers. However, this anonymity property is easily abused by criminals. In 2011, Chen et al. proposed a novel electronic cash system with trustee-based anonymity revocation from pairing. On demand, the trustee can disclose the identity for -cash. But, in this paper we point out that Chen et al. 's scheme is subjected to some drawbacks. To contribute secure electronic cash schemes, we propose a new offline electronic cash scheme with anonymity revocation. We also provide the formally security proofs of the unlinkability and unforgeability. Furthermore, the proposed scheme ensures the property of avoiding merchant frauds.
Introduction
Due to the fast progress of computer networks and Internet, information technology is used in electronic commerce. Many electronic commerce services can be found over the internet. So, an electronic payment mechanism is necessary for electronic commerce. And electronic payment is one of the key issues of electronic commerce development. To realize the digitalization of traditional cash and electronic payment, in 1983, Chaum suggested the first electronic cash scheme [1] . Popularly, in an electronic cash scheme, there are three participants: the bank, the customer, and the merchant. First, a customer opens an account in a bank. Then, he withdraws an -cash from his account and pays it to a merchant. After checking the electronic cash's validity, the merchant accepts it and deposits it to the bank. For security and efficiency, there are a number of requirements for an electronic cash scheme, such as anonymity, unforgeability, unreusability, divisibility, transferability, and portability [2] . Some of them are listed below.
Anonymity/Unlinkability. The customer of the cash must be anonymous. As long as the coin is spent legitimately, neither [14] showed that Eslami and Talebi's scheme is subjected to some weaknesses in perceptibility of double spender, unforgeability, and date attachability. Baseri et al. also contributed a novel electronic cash scheme.
Untraceable electronic cash is an attractive payment tool for electronic commerce because its anonymity property can ensure the privacy of payers. However, this anonymity property is easily abused by criminals. In 2011, Chen et al. [15] proposed an electronic cash system with trustee-based anonymity revocation from pairing. On demand, the trustee can disclose the identity of the owner of an -cash. Chen et al. claimed that their scheme is the first attempt to incorporate mutual authentication and key agreement into -cash protocols and their scheme satisfies the security requirements of untraceability, verifiability, unforgeability, and anonymity revocation. But, in 2012, Chang [16] claimed that he finds some weaknesses of Chen et al. 's scheme. Then, Chen et al. [17] immediately provided a response to rebut Chang's attacks. By thoroughly investigating Chen et al. 's scheme, we find that, despite Chang's attacks being really wrong, Chen et al. 's scheme is surely insecure. Chen et al. 's scheme is subjected to some drawbacks. (1) The first flaw is the attack on the unforgeability by the dishonest customer. (2) The second flaw is the attack on double spending owner tracing. (3) The third flaw is the potential bank attack.
To contribute secure electronic cash schemes, we propose a new offline electronic cash scheme with anonymity revocation. Furthermore, the proposed scheme ensures the property of avoiding merchant frauds.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Related concept of bilinear pairing and CDH problem are introduced in Section 2. In Section 3, we show some weaknesses of Chen et al. 's scheme. In Section 4 we propose a new electronic cash scheme with anonymity revocation. In Section 5 we show the verifiability of the proposed scheme. Double spender detection is covered in Section 6. In Section 7 we show that the proposed scheme satisfies uncheatability of merchants. Provable security of our scheme is covered in Section 8. In Section 9 we compare our scheme with the others. Finally conclusions are given in Section 10.
Preliminary
2.1. The Bilinear Pairing. Let 1 be a cyclic additive group generated by , whose order is a prime , and let 2 be a cyclic multiplicative group of the same order. Let : 1 × 1 → 2 be a pairing map which satisfies the following conditions:
(1) Bilinearity: for any , , ∈ 1 , we have ( + , ) = ( , ) ( , ).
In particular, for any , ∈ , ( , ) = ( , ) = ( , ) = ( , ) .
(2) Nondegeneracy: there exists , ∈ 1 , such that ( , ) ̸ = 1.
(3) Computability: there is an efficient algorithm to compute ( , ) for all , ∈ 1 .
The CDH Problem.
Let be a cyclic additive group of prime order and a generator of . The computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) problem is to compute for given , , ∈ .
Effective Attacks on Chen et al.'s Scheme
In this section, we show the drawbacks of Chen et al. 's scheme [15] . For the sake of brevity, we omit the review of Chen et al. 's scheme. To know Chen et al. 's scheme in detail, readers can read literature [15] .
Attack on the Unforgeability by the Dishonest Customer.
When the customer obtains an -cash { , , ( , )}, he can randomly select ∈ * and forge -cash { , ⋅ , ( ⋅ , ⋅ )}, because the -cash { , , ( , )} satisfies
So,
Then,
That is to say, the customer forges a valid -cash { , ⋅ , ( ⋅ , ⋅ )}. Of course, in payment protocol, when the merchant gets an -cash from customers, he also can similarly forge -cash. Further, these forged -cash make the scheme fail in double spending owner tracing, because it is impossible to find the customer identity from ⋅ . Note that ( , ) is a signature on and . Furthermore, does not play distinction function to an -cash. is only a randomly selected number. Any customer can randomly choose any for their -cash. If has some function, it is only to certain customer. It is not strange that different customers may choose same for their -cash. So, this attack is a successful forgery.
Attack by the Dishonest Merchant.
In practice, there are always many merchants from different shops. After receiving an -cash { , , ( , )} from a customer, the merchant may spend { , , ( , )} to another merchant. This attack is correct due to the fact that the verification equation
is only related to , , , . And no extra information should be provided by customers in the verification process. Later, even if the bank finds double spending, the bank and the trustee cannot find real double spender, because the double spender may not be the customer himself.
Potential
Attack by the Bank. However, in payment protocol, the only verification to the -cash { , , ( , )} is to examine whether the following equation holds:
But, when let = pub ( is a randomly selected number in * ) in the above equation, then
So, the bank can randomly select and . Then Let
}. This apparently violates the withdrawal protocol above the customer and the bank together performing a blind signature function to complete the -cash withdrawal.
Our Proposed Scheme
Based on an id-based signature scheme [21] proposed by Hess and an efficient id-based blind signature [22] proposed by Zhang and Kim, we propose an offline electronic cash scheme with anonymity revocation. In the proposed scheme there are four participants: Trustee , the bank , the customer , and the merchant . There are five protocols: license issuing, withdrawal, payment, deposit, and -cash owner tracing. Here any communication between any two entities should be encrypted, and this can be done by incorporating mutual authentication and key agreement protocols, likely in [15] . Here, for brevity, we omit those encryptions in five protocols.
System Setup.
In this stage, the Key Generation Center (KGC) chooses a cyclic additive group 1 which is generated by with prime order and chooses a cyclic multiplicative group 2 of the same order and a bilinear map : 1 × 1 → 2 . KGC also chooses a random ∈ * as the master key and sets pub = public and chooses cryptographic hash
When the customer submits his identity, ID to the KGC, the KGC computes the public key = 1 (ID ) and private key = for the customer . Similarly, the KGC generates the public/private key pairs ( , ), ( , ), and ( , ) for Trustee , the Bank , and the Merchant , respectively.
License-Issuing Protocol.
Before withdrawing -cash from the bank, customer needs to ask trustee to issue him a license. The following steps describe the protocol, which is also illustrated in Box 1.
(1) Customer selects four random numbers, , , 1 , 2 ∈ * , and sends {ID , , , 1 , 2 } to Trustee .
(2) chooses a random number, ∈ * , and computes
Here is a symmetric encryption algorithm, and is a secret key. (3) To sign on
, trustee selects a random number, ∈ * , and computes = ( , ) ,
The trustee also signs on 1 + 2 + 3 + 4 ; here 1 = ( + ) pub , 2 = ( 1 + 2 ) pub . 3 = 1 pub , and 4 = pub . selects a random number, ∈ * , and computes = ( , ) ,
After that, trustee stores ( , ) to the database and sends ( , , , , ) to the customer . (4) The customer computes
and checks whether
If so, The customer obtains the license, ( , , ) and the signature ( , ) on 1 + 2 + 3 + 4 .
Withdrawal Protocol.
To complete the -cash withdrawal, customer and bank together perform the following steps. This protocol is also illustrated in Box 2.
(1) Customer sends {ID , (
, , )} to the bank . (2) first computes
If so, the bank selects a random number, ∈ * , computes = , and sends to the customer . 
And checks whether
Obtains the license, ( , , ) and the signature, ( , ) on 1 + 2 + 3 + 4 Box 1: License-issuing protocol.
Customer Bank
Checks whether 
Checks whether
and sends ℎ to the bank . (4) The bank computes
and sends to the customer . 
If so, the customer obtains an -cash ( , , ).
Payment Protocol.
When the customer wants to spend his cash at the shop, the customer and the merchant do the following steps. This protocol is also illustrated in Box 3.
(1) Customer sends ( , , ) to the merchant . (2) The merchant checks whether
If so, he selects a random number ∈ * and computes = ( , ) ,
Then he sends ( , ) to the customer . (3) The customer computes
If so, he computes
Then he sends ( 1 , 2 , 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , , , ) to the merchant .
The merchant checks whether Checks whether
Checks whether the -cash is being double spent; if it is fresh, reedits the merchant's account Box 4: Deposit protocol. and computes
If so, the merchant accepts the payment.
Deposit Protocol.
When the merchant wants to deposit the received -cash into his account in the bank , the following steps are done between the bank and the merchant . This protocol is also illustrated in Box 4. 
and checks whether ( , ) = ( + 2 (LST ‖ ) , pub ) ,
If the above four equations hold, the bank accepts the coin, stores it in the deposit table, and transfers money to the merchant .
Revoking the Anonymity.
In the case that an -cash ( , , ) is abused by a criminal, whether the cash is spent twice or not, the trustee can revoke the anonymity of thecash by the provided by the bank. As soon as the trustee receives the request of revoking anonymity, checks his database to find record ( , ) and computes the identity information ID = ( ) ⊕ by using his secret key .
Verifiability of the Proposed Scheme
Firstly, we show that the blind license
can be verified by equation
‖ ). Secondly, we show that the -cash can be verified by equation
In fact,
Thirdly, we show that the signature ( , ) on (LST, , ) by merchant can be verified by equation
. Fourthly, we show that the information ( 1 , 2 ) can be verified by the equations In fact,
Finally, we show that the signature ( , ) on 1 + 2 + 3 + 4 by trustee can be verified by the equation
(36)
Double Spender Detection
In the case that the customer spends an -cash twice or more, the bank can compute
Then, the bank checks its databases in the withdrawal protocol to find the record {ID , ( −1 LST, , )} and knows the identity information ID of the malicious customer .
Here ( 1 , 2 ) and ( 1 , 2 ) are information the customer sends to the merchant in payment phase in twice consumption, respectively. In fact,
(38) So,
Hence, the bank can compute
and obtain the identity information ID of the malicious customer .
Uncheatability of Merchants
When the customer sends -cash ( , , ) to the merchant, the merchant computes signature ( , ) on ( , , ). When the merchant sends ( , ) to the customer, the customer first verifies it using the public key of the merchant . When ( , ) satisfies the verification equation, the customer sends ( 1 , 2 , 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , , ) to the merchant. If later the merchant uses -cash ( , , ) and ( 1 , 2 , 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , , ) to spend to other merchants and cheats the customer, the customer can show the merchant's signature to some arbitration agency. So, the scheme can effectively resist merchants cheat attack.
Provable Security
In this section, we show that the proposed scheme satisfies the property of unlinkability and unforgeability.
Definition 1 (the linkability game). Let be a security parameter and let 1 and 2 be two customers. 1 , 2 , and the bank are involved in the following game.
Step 1. The bank outputs two Licenses 0 and 1 .
Step 2. We randomly choose a bit ∈ {0, 1} and place ( , ) and ( 1− , 1− ) on the private input tapes of 1 and 2 , respectively. The bit will not be disclosed to the bank .
Step 3. The bank and two customers 1 , 2 perform the withdrawal protocol of the proposed scheme.
Step 4. If 1 and 2 output two -cash ( , , ) and ( 1− , 1− , 1− ) on their private tapes, respectively, we give the two 3 tuples in a random order to the bank; otherwise, ⊥ is given to .
Step 5. The bank outputs * ∈ {0, 1} as the guess of . wins the game if * = . We define the advantage of as
Definition 2 (unlinkability). The proposed scheme satisfies the unlinkability property if the advantage Adv Traceality ( ) is negligible.
Theorem 3. The proposed scheme satisfies the unlinkability property.
Proof of Theorem 3. We consider the condition in Definition 1. Let ( , , ) be one of the two -cash given to the bank and let ( , ℎ, ) be the view of the bank in one of the withdrawal protocols. It is sufficient to show that there exist two random factors ( , ) that map ( , ℎ, ) to ( , , ). 
(42) So, it holds when = + . It is to say that ( , ) always exists regardless of the values ( , , ) and ( , ℎ, ). Therefore, even an infinitely powerful bank outputs a correct value with probability of exactly 1/2. So, the proposed scheme satisfies the unlinkability property.
Definition 4 (the forgeability game). The adversary F and the challenger A play the following game.
Step 1. The challenger A takes a security parameter and generates the public parameters params and sends params to the adversary F.
Step 2. The adversary F can perform polynomially bounded number of hash queries, extract queries, and -cash queries. These three kinds of queries answer the hash function, private key, and -cash query by the adversary F, respectively.
Step 3. The adversary F outputs a tuple = (( , , ), ID ). This tuple satisfies the following requirements:
(1) ( , , ) is a valid -cash with regard to the bank .
(2) The adversary F has never requested the private key of the bank .
(3) = (( , , ), ID ) has never been queried during the -cash query.
Definition 5 (unforgeability). An adversary F is said to be an ( , , , , )-forger if it has advantage at least in the above game, runs in time at most , and makes at most , , and extract, -cash, and hashing queries, respectively. A scheme is said to be ( , , , , )-secure against A in the sense of unforgeable against -cash existential forgery attack if no ( , , , , )-forger exists.
Theorem 6. If the CDH problem is hard, then the proposed scheme is secure against -cash existential forgery attack.
Proof of Theorem 6. Suppose that F is a forger who can forge -cash in the proposed scheme. A CDH instance ( , , ) is given for , ∈ * , By using the forgery algorithm F, we will construct an algorithm A which outputs the CDH solution in . Algorithm A performs the following simulation by interacting with the forger F.
Setup. Algorithm A sets pub = and starts by giving F the system parameters including ( , pub ). At any time, F can query the random oracle 1 , 2 and extract and cash queries. To answer these queries, A does the following. If ( ‖ , ) already appears on the 2 -list, A chooses another , ∈ * and tries again. Otherwise, A computes = ⋅ pub and stores ( ‖ , ) on the 2 -list. Then A responds to F with ( , ). Indeed, the output is valid -cash on for ID. In fact,
Output. If A does not abort as a result of F's extract query, then F's view is identical to its view in the real attack. By Forking Lemma, after replying F with the same random tape, A obtains two valid -cash:
Correspondingly, there are two valid signatures ( , ) and ( * , ), because
So, by the security proof of [22] , A obtains ( ) = = (ℎ − ℎ * ) −1 ( − * ). This completes the proof.
Comparisons
In this section, we compare our scheme with [15, [18] [19] [20] in some features, communication efficiency, and computation cost. The features are anonymity/unlinkability, unforgeability, verification, double-spending owner tracing, anonymity revocation, and uncheatability of merchant. Our scheme satisfies all of above features, but the others do not. We show the comparison result in Table 1 . In Table 2 , we compare the communication efficiency of our scheme with other schemes. Fan et al. 's scheme [18] and Zhang et al. 's scheme [20] are not trustee based, and therefore they do not have license-issuing protocol and owner tracing protocol. Juang's scheme [19] also does not have license-issuing protocol and owner tracing protocol but has the initializing phase and recovering phase. For comparison, the numbers of rounds of initializing phase and recovering phase in Juang's scheme are computed to license-issuing protocol and owner tracing protocol, respectively. By Table 2 , the proposed scheme demonstrates better communication efficiency under enhanced security. Our scheme and schemes [15, 20] are all id-based scheme using bilinear pairings. So, in Table 3 , we compare the computation cost of our scheme with schemes [15, 20] . It is necessary to illustrate that Zhang et al. 's scheme [20] has no license-issuing protocol and owner tracing protocol and for fair comparison, we have not computed the computation cost of encryption and its related computation cost in Chen et al. 's scheme. Compared with Chen et al. 's scheme, there are eleven more pairings computations in the proposed scheme. These eleven pairings computations are in payment protocol and deposit protocol and useful to prevent the merchant from cheat. In practice, we can use elliptic curves to reduce the computation cost of bilinear pairings.
Conclusion
In this paper, we show that Chen et al. 's electronic cash scheme is suffering from some weaknesses in unforgeability and merchant frauds. To contribute a secure scheme, we propose a new offline electronic cash scheme with anonymity revocation. We also provide the formally security proofs of the unlinkability and unforgeability. Furthermore, the proposed scheme ensures the property of avoiding merchant frauds.
